A Companion to Diaspora and Transnationalism

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Chapter 10
When the Diaspora Returns Home
Ambivalent Encounters with the Ethnic Homeland
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Introduction: The Return of the Diaspora

In recent decades, the total volume of ethnic return migration has increased significantly. In contrast to the return migration of first-generation diasporic peoples who move back to their homeland (country of birth), ethnic return migration refers to later-generation descendants of diasporic peoples who "return" to their countries of ancestral origin after living outside their ethnic homelands for generations. Although a number of scholars have examined how diasporas have continued to evolve through further migratory scattering, relatively few have studied how certain diasporic peoples have also been returning to their ethnic homelands, a form of diasporic "in-gathering" or the "unmaking of diasporas" (Münz and Ohliger 2003; Van Hear 1998: 6, 47–48; see also Clifford 1994: 304). In fact, certain diasporas are now characterized by a tension between centrifugal and centripetal migratory forces.

The most prominent example of diasporic return is that of the millions of Jews in the diaspora who have migrated to Israel since World War II. The largest group of Jewish ethnic return migrants has come from the former Soviet Union, more than 770,000 of whom entered Israel between 1990 and 1999 (see Levy and Weinrod 2005; Münz and Ohliger 2003; Remennick 2003). In Western Europe, 4 million ethnic German descendants from Eastern Europe return-migrated to their ethnic homeland between 1950 and 1999 (see Münz and Ohliger 2003). Other European countries, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Poland, and Hungary have received much smaller populations of ethnic return migrants from Latin American and Eastern Europe (see Capo Zmegac, Vob, and Roth 2010; Cook-Martin and Viladrich 2009; Fox 2009; King and Christou 2010; Skrentny et al. 2009). After the collapse of the

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Soviet Union, 2.8 million ethnic Russians living outside Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus returned to their ethnic homeland between 1990 and 1998 (see Pilkington 1998). In East Asia, close to a million second- and third-generation Japanese and Korean descendants scattered across Latin America, Eastern Europe, and China have return-migrated to Japan and Korea since the late 1980s (see Song 2009; Tsuda 2003a). China and Taiwan have also been receiving ethnic Chinese descendants from various Southeast Asian countries. There has been limited ethnic return migration to various Southeast Asian countries as well. Although most diasporic “returnees” are labor migrants from poorer countries, there is also a smaller but growing population of professionals and students from developed countries in North America and Europe who migrate to their countries of ancestral origin.

Not only is the total volume of ethnic return migration quite substantial, it is generally long term or permanent in nature. Diasporic returnees in the Middle East and Europe often migrate in order to settle permanently in their countries of ethnic origin. Although some ethnic return migrants (especially in East Asia) are sojourners who intend to remain only a few years in their ancestral homelands (as labor migrants and target earners), a number of them are prolonging their stays and settling, often with family members (see Tsuda 1999). The exceptions here are professional and student migrants from the developed world, who generally remain in their ethnic homelands temporarily (see, e.g., Jain 2012).

The Causes of Diasporic Return

Economic motives and ethnic return migration

Most diasporic descendants are not returning to their ethnic homelands simply to reconnect with their ancestral roots or explore their ethnic heritage. Instead, they are generally migrating from less developed countries to more economically prosperous ancestral homelands (often in the developed world) in search of jobs, higher incomes, and a better standard of living. In this sense, diasporic return from the developing world initially appears to be another form of international labor migration caused by widening economic disparities between rich and poor countries.

Although ethnicity is generally not a “pull” factor that draws diasporic descendants to the ancestral homeland in search of ancestral heritage, it can be a “push” factor that forces them out of their country of birth. In the past, large ethnic return migration flows were instigated by ethno-political persecution caused by major geopolitical disruptions, such as the dissolution of empires, colonial regimes, and multi-ethnic states, and not by direct economic pressure per se (see Brubaker 1998; Capo Žmegac 2005, 2010). Nonetheless, ethnic discrimination can play a role even in cases of economically motivated return migration. For instance, continuing ethnic insecurity and discrimination in Eastern Europe sometimes worsened the socioeconomic situation of ethnic minorities in these countries, causing them to

Ethnicity seems to play a greater role for ethnic return migrants from the developed world. Coming from rich countries, such individuals have much less economic incentive to migrate to their ethnic homelands (which are sometimes poorer countries) and therefore their numbers are quite limited. Although many are seeking professional, educational, or business investment opportunities in their countries of ancestral origin, the desire to reconnect with their ethnic roots and explore their cultural heritage seems to be a stronger motive compared to ethnic return migrants from poorer, developing countries. Asian Americans in East Asia cite the desire to explore their ethnic ancestry as a reason for return migration (see Kim 2009) as do Greek Americans in Greece (Christou 2006: 1050–1051) and Indian Americans in India (Jain 2012). A limited number of individuals from developed countries travel to their ancestral homelands as cultural heritage tourists in order to explore their ethnic roots, sometimes organized on tours sponsored by ethnic organizations and homeland governments (see, e.g., Kibria 2002; Louie 2004). The most notable examples of such organized ethnic tourism are to Israel, China, and South Korea.²

Transnational ethnic ties and diasporic return

Although diasporic returns have been caused more by economic pressures than by ancestral ties persisting across borders, such transnational ethnic affiliations determine the direction of these migrant flows. In response to economic pressures, diasporic descendants have chosen to migrate to their ethnic homelands instead of to other advanced industrialized countries because of their nostalgic affiliation to their country of ethnic origin.

Most ordinary labor migration flows are structured by pre-existing social networks and institutional connections between sending and receiving countries, which provide transnational linkages enabling migrants to move across borders and relocate to foreign countries. In the case of ethnic return migration, however, most diasporic descendants have lost any substantial transnational social connections or cultural contacts with their countries of ethnic origin, except in a few cases where the ethnic homeland is located in a neighboring country. Therefore, the transnational ethnic ties that channel diasporic return migrants to their ethnic homelands are based on an imagined, nostalgic, ethnic affinity to an ancestral country which most have never visited.

Although most diasporic descendants have developed a nostalgic identification with their ethnic homelands, the strength of such sentimental ethnic attachments varies. For instance, Russian Jews do not have a strong transnational ethnic affiliation to Israel because of their cultural assimilation and suppression of nationalist sentiment among 2003). Others, like strong awareness recovering their 1

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sentiment among ethnic minorities in the former Soviet Union (see Remennick 2003). Others, like the Argentines of Spanish and Italian descent, do not have a strong awareness of their ethnic heritage, but develop an appreciation for it while recovering their homeland nationality (Cook-Martín, 2005).

Immigrant ethnic minorities sometimes develop strong transnational identifications with their countries of ethnic origin in response to the discriminatory exclusion and marginalization they experience in dominant society (e.g., see Espiritu 2003: 86–88; Levitt 2001: 19–20; Parreñas 2001: 55–59), which makes them feel that they do not fully belong to their countries of birth. For instance, ethnic Hungarian descendants in Romania feel solidarity with the greater Hungarian nation partly in response to their adversarial relations with majority Romanians. Ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe seem to have had analogous experiences in the past when faced with discrimination. Some ethnic minorities (such as Asian Americans and Japanese-descent nikkeijin in Latin America) are forever racialized as foreigners with essentialized cultural attachments to their native countries of origin because of their phenotypic differences from the mainstream populace; this can cause them to construct a romanticized view of their ethnic homeland as the country where they racially belong (Kim 2009; Louie 2004; Tsuda 2003a: ch. 2).

However, ethnic minorities can also develop relatively strong homeland attachments because their ethnic ancestry and countries of origin are constructed and portrayed in a favorable manner. Indeed, most diasporic descendants imagine their ancestral homelands from afar in rather idealized, romantic, if not mythical ways (see Cohen 1997: 184–185). Many of these positive images come from their parents and grandparents, whose nostalgic romanticization of their homeland is a product of their prolonged separation from their countries of origin (see Grossuti 2006; Kim 2009; von Koppenfels 2009; Tsuda 2003a: ch. 2; Viladrich 2005). Other images come from the globalized mass media and popular culture, which has become the primary means of imagining homelands from afar. Attachments to homelands are especially strong for diasporic peoples located in neighboring countries where ethnic-cultural links exist across national borders, as with the Hungarian Romanians and Finland Swedes.

Therefore, when diasporic descendants are faced with economic pressures to emigrate, many naturally have turned to their ethnic homelands instead of migrating to other advanced industrialized nations because of their sentimental ethnic attachments to their countries of ancestral origin. Not only did these countries seem more ethnically accessible, it was presumed that their co-ethnic status would facilitate their immigrant social integration.

In addition, such transnational ethnic affiliations have been substantiated by homeland governments, which have adopted immigration and nationality policies that reach out to their diasporic descendants abroad and allow them to return to their ethnic homelands. Such policies of homeland governments are based on the essentialized assumption that these descendants of former emigrants, despite being born and raised abroad, would be culturally similar to the host populace because of their shared bloodline. Diasporic descendants have been imagined as an integral
part of a broader, deterritorialized cultural nation of “co-ethnics” living in other countries but united by common descent (cf. Joppke 2005: 159), thus invoking a natural ethnic affinity between the nation-state and its diaspora. However, the specific reasons that made homeland governments decide to welcome back their ethnic descendants from abroad vary according to geographical region. Ethnic return migration policies in Europe (and Israel) are generally based on an ethnic protection or ethnic affinity rationale based on the historical connection of these countries to their diasporic peoples abroad (cf. Skrentny et al. 2009; see also Joppke 2005: 23–24). In Israel and Germany, these policies were initially implemented to protect their diasporic peoples from ethnic persecution. When the state of Israel was established after the Holocaust, all Jews were granted the right to return to their ancestral homeland partly to provide them a safe haven from future persecution as well as to build up and strengthen the Jewish state (Joppke and Rosenhek 2009). Likewise, in Germany, ethnic German descendants expelled from Eastern Europe after World War II and those living in Communist countries during the Cold War were allowed to return as Aussiedler under the presumption of ethnic persecution.

In contrast, ethnic preferences in immigration policy and nationality law in other European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Russia) are based almost exclusively on an ethnic affinity rationale with diasporic descendants born abroad as part of a greater ethnic nation beyond state borders (Joppke 2005: 116–117, 245–246). Because of historical and racial ties to the diaspora, ethnic descendants are seen by their respective homeland governments as “our peoples” who therefore have a right to return to their ancestral homeland. Although some type of ethnic protection rationale can be invoked, the underlying justification is based on a sense of state responsibility/obligation toward their diasporic descendants abroad (Cook-Martin 2005; Joppke 2005: 246; Skrentny et al. 2009; de Tinguy 2003: 116–119).

Unlike their European counterparts, East Asian countries have invited back their diasporic descendants mainly for economic purposes (Skrentny et al. 2009; see also Joppke 2005: 158–159). Japan and South Korea have imported large numbers of ethnic return migrants in response to acute unskilled labor shortages caused by decades of economic prosperity coupled with low fertility rates. South Korea and China have encouraged wealthy and highly skilled ethnic descendants in the diaspora to return-migrate in order to promote economic investment from abroad and to tap their professional skills (see Cheng 2002: 91–92 and Skrentny et al. 2009). However, these countries generally decided to allow diasporic return because they assumed ethnic return migrants of shared descent and presumed cultural affinity would be easier to assimilate and integrate socially than other immigrants and would therefore not disrupt the country’s ethno-racial balance.

Such ethnic immigration policies have been an important factor in facilitating diasporic return by enabling co-ethnic descendants abroad to secure access to their ancestral homelands by virtue of their ethnic heritage and descent (Van Hear 1998: 48). Many diasporic descendants have chosen to return-migrate to their ethnic homelands for economic reasons because of the much greater ease of entry compared to other countries of immigration (see, e.g., Tsuda 1999). If homeland governments...
had not openly admitted their diasporic descendants, most ethnic return migration flows would have remained quite small and many of the migrants would have headed to other advanced industrialized nations.

**Ambivalent Homecomings: Ethnic and Socioeconomic Marginalization in the Ancestral Homeland**

Although many ethnic return migrants feel a nostalgic ethnic affiliation to their countries of ancestral origin, because they have been living outside their ethnic homeland for generations, they are essentially "returning" to a foreign country from which their ancestors came. As a result, their diasporic homecomings are often quite ambivalent, if not negative, experiences. Despite initial expectations that their presumed ethnic affinity with the host society (as co-ethnic) would facilitate their social integration, they are often ethnically excluded as foreigners in their ancestral homelands because of their alien cultural differences (see also Capo Zmec 2005: 199; 2010: 21–24). They are also socioeconomically marginalized as unskilled immigrant workers performing low-status jobs that are shunned by the host populace. Such negative ethnic receptions are disappointing, if not dismaying for many of ethnic return migrants and shatter their previously favorable, romantic images of their ethnic homeland (King and Christou 2010: 111–112; Stefansson 2004: 9; Tsuda 2003a: ch. 3).

**Ethnic exclusion: Diasporic returnees as cultural foreigners**

Many diasporic return migrants simply lack the linguistic and cultural competence necessary for acceptance as co-ethnics in their ancestral homelands. Since they have been born and raised in foreign countries, they have generally lost their ancestral language and customs, especially if they have lived outside their ancestral countries for many generations. A number of them have also been subject to past nationalist assimilation projects or ethnic discrimination in their countries of birth that suppressed minority cultures and diasporic allegiances to their ancestral homelands, especially in former communist regimes. This includes the Russification, secularization, and stigmatization of Soviet Jews (Remennick 1998), the ethno-cultural discrimination against ethnic German descendants in Eastern Europe, and the prohibition of Korean Chinese minority culture during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Song 2009). Japanese-descent ethnic minorities in South America (especially in Brazil) and Spanish- and Italian-descent Argentines have also been historically influenced by nationalization projects, often under dictatorship regimes (Cook-Martín, 2005; Tsuda 2001).

Therefore, when these diasporic descendants "return" to their ethnic homelands, they are ethnically excluded as culturally different foreigners and strangers (see also Capo Zmec 2005: 206–207). Despite their shared bloodline, their ethnic heritage
is seemingly denied on cultural grounds by their ancestral compatriots when they are identified as foreign nationals. For instance, Jews from Russia in Israel are called "Russians"; ethnic Germans from Russia or Poland are labeled "Russians" or "Poles" in Germany; ethnic Hungarian descendants from Romania become "Romanians" in Hungary; Korean-descent Chosŏnjok from China become "Chinese" in South Korea; and Japanese descent nikkeijin from South America are seen as Brazilians, Peruvians, or simply gaijin (foreigners) in Japan. In this manner, co-ethnic descendants from abroad who were once seen as integral members of a deterritorialized and racialized ethnic nation based on a shared bloodline are now excluded from the ethno-national community on the basis of cultural difference.

Often, the alien cultural characteristics of ethnic return migrants are seen in a pejorative manner by the host society, especially if they come from countries that are less developed and lower in the global hierarchy of nations. In such cases, the national labels used by the host populace to refer to them (Russians, Romanians, Chinese, Brazilians, etc.) are based on negative stereotypes and prejudices toward these countries as economically backward and culturally inferior and can even be used as ethnic slurs. For instance, Israeli attitudes toward Russian Jews are influenced by negative mass-media stereotyping of Russians as "mafia men, prostitutes, and welfare mothers" and there is considerable suspicion about their secular lifestyle, lack of Jewishness, and foreignness (Remennick 2003; 2007: 154; Feldman 2003). Hungarians view their co-ethnics from Romania scornfully, with suspicion and disdain, as poor people from an inferior country who may even take jobs away from Hungarians (Fox 2003: 456–457). In South Korea, negative reports have proliferated about ethnic Korean Chosŏnjok, emphasizing their insufficient work ethic, untrustworthiness, over-Sinicized behavior and attitudes, and lack of Korean national loyalty (Song 2009). Japanese Brazilians are often viewed by mainstream Japanese as poor, lazy, easy-going, culturally inferior, overly individualistic, and noisy (Tsuda 2003a: ch. 2). Even Argentines of Spanish descent are seen as unreliable workers with a questionable work ethic (Cook-Martín and Viladrich 2009). In some countries with newer diasporic populations, like Russia, Japan, and South Korea, ethnic return migrants can be seen as descendants of traitors who left and betrayed the ethnic homeland or as descendants of poor, uneducated emigrants who could not survive economically and had to abandon their home country (Park 2006; Pilkington 1998: 168–171; Tsuda 2003a, ch. 2).

Because diasporic return migrants have prior expectations of ethnic belonging in their country of ancestral origin, most of them are quite surprised, if not shocked, by their ethnic rejection and social exclusion. As their previous idealized and nostalgic images of their ancestral country are seriously challenged, they become culturally alienated immigrant minorities whose members are strangers in their ethnic homeland. Although they were often minorities in their countries of birth because of their foreign racial descent, they again become ethnic minorities when they return to their country of ancestral origin, this time because of their cultural foreignness. Ethnic return migration is therefore not a type of diasporic consolidation or regrouping. It is consciousness of the level of varies dependin homeland popul lived outside the heritage in their its diasporic per instance, ethnic within the East to Japan are cross former cultural barriers as:

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regrouping. It is instead producing new ethnic minorities through an increased consciousness of cultural heterogeneity among peoples of shared descent.

The level of ethnic marginalization experienced by diasporic return migrants varies, depending on the cultural and linguistic distance between them and the homeland populace. This is partly a function of the length of time that they have lived outside their homelands as well as their level of assimilation and loss of ethnic heritage in their countries of birth. It also depends on whether the homeland and its diasporic peoples are located in different cultural regions of the world. For instance, ethnic Korean Chosŏnjok from China returning to South Korea remain within the East Asian cultural region whereas Latin American nikkeijin returning to Japan are crossing a greater cultural divide. Ethnic return migrants moving from former communist to advanced capitalist countries also encounter significant cultural barriers associated with two very different socioeconomic systems.

In contrast, although Argentines of Spanish descent migrate across a vast geographical distance to Spain, they are in an ethnic homeland that shares a broader Hispanic culture and language because of its historical colonial ties to Argentina. Therefore, Spanish Argentines seem to enjoy greater ethnic acceptance in their homeland (see also Viladrich 2005) and the problems they encounter seem mainly to be related to their low-level immigrant jobs and socioeconomic marginalization (Cook-Martin and Viladrich 2009). In contrast, Argentines of Italian descent who return-migrate to Italy feel greater cultural and linguistic differences with the local populace and their social integration is more difficult (Grossutti 2006).

In general, diasporic descendants whose ethnic homelands are in neighboring countries tend to encounter fewer cultural difficulties upon return-migrating, since they tend to have much greater contact with the homeland, allowing them to maintain their cultural heritage. This is especially the case with the Finland Swedes, whose linguistic and cultural affinity with neighboring Sweden enable them to ethnically integrate quite successfully in their ancestral homeland. Another example is ethnic Russians who relocated during Soviet expansion to nearby communist countries, which were under Russian political and cultural influence for decades. As a result, ethnic Russian repatriates encounter fewer problems than other ethnic return migrants because they share a common Russian language and culture with the host populace (Ohlinger and Münz 2003: 6–7; Pilkington 1998: 173–175; de Tinguy 2003: 125).

Socioeconomic marginalization: Dealing with degrading immigrant jobs

Diasporic returnees are also socioeconomically marginalized since they are frequently offered only low-status, unskilled immigrant jobs that are shunned by the majority populace. Because a number of them are from relatively well-educated, middle-class backgrounds, ethnic return migration can involve considerable declassing and
downward mobility. Although they are granted favorable immigrant legal status because of their racial ties to the host society as diasporic descendants, this does not give them privileged access to the labor market because of the linguistic and cultural barriers they face. In addition, their educational credentials and skills from developing countries are often not recognized or transferable in advanced capitalist countries (see, e.g., Remennick 2003: 277; 2009). Others are recruited specifically to fill unskilled labor shortages in their ethnic homelands and do not have the social network contacts needed to access higher-level jobs.

Many of the negative experiences that ethnic return migrants have in their homelands are therefore the result of their socioeconomic marginalization, which is often just as severe as other immigrant workers. Not only must they toil as unskilled, manual laborers in difficult, stigmatized jobs, they must cope with a serious decline in social status from former, respected middle-class occupations to degrading working-class jobs, which can have negative effects on self-worth and self-esteem and become a source of social class prejudice from the majority society. Even ethnic return migrants who have maintained their ancestral heritage and are less culturally alienated in their ethnic homelands often still have negative diasporic homcomings because of the degrading and low-status jobs they must endure (see Cook-Martín and Viladrich 2009; Fox 2003: 452–453; 2009).

Because of their marginalization as immigrant minorities, many ethnic return migrants remain socially unintegrated in their homelands. In some cases, they are segregated in immigrant ethnic communities and interact primarily amongst themselves in their own languages. Some of these communities, such as those of the ethnic German Aussiedler, Russian Jews in Israel, and Japanese-descent nikkeijin in Japan, have become quite cohesive and extensive with an array of ethnic businesses and services, as well as an active ethnic mass media, enabling many of them to conduct their daily lives without much contact with the local populace (see also Remennick 2003: 378–379; de Tinguy 2003: 124). In response to their social exclusion in their homelands, ethnic return migrants have withdrawn into their enclaved communities and subcultures, often resisting attempts by mainstream society to culturally assimilate and socially incorporate them (Remennick 2003: 382, 378–379; Tsuda 2003a: ch. 5).

Therefore, despite their racialized ethnic affinity with their ancestral homeland, the “homecomings” of ethnic return migrants are quite ambivalent and they often experience levels of ethnic and socioeconomic marginalization equivalent to ordinary labor migrants (see Ohliger and Münz 2003: 15). However, diasporic returnees often feel much more socially alienated than other immigrants because their stronger prior ethnic affiliation and identification with the homeland causes them to expect an ethnic homecoming befitting diasporic descendants returning to their land of ancestral origin. When it does not materialize and they are confronted by social exclusion instead, they feel more estranged and disillusioned than other immigrants who do not arrive with such ethnic expectations. Ironically therefore, the immigrant group that is most ethnically related to the host society can often experience the most social alienation.
Ethnic Return Migration from the First World: A More Positive Homecoming?

The ethnic reception of diasporic returnees from developed countries seems to be somewhat better for a number of reasons. Although they are just as culturally alien as their counterparts from developing countries and can be subject to some ethnic prejudice, they are generally more respected because of their First World origins. Most importantly, they are not socioeconomically marginalized in stigmatized working-class jobs because most of them return-migrate with relatively high status as professionals, business investors, or students, leading to a more positive reception and social experiences.

Ethnic return migrants from developed countries definitely benefit from the higher stature of their countries of birth and are not subject to the negative stereotypes attached to developing countries. For instance, Korean Americans in South Korea can be perceived as role models and valuable assets because they represent the English-speaking, internationally successful, global Korean. Such images are derived from past respect for the United States, as a source of prosperity, cultural capital, and popular culture in a globalized world (Park 2006). Nonetheless, they are still subject to negative attitudes about the United States and are also singled out for their lack of cultural competence as people who have become too Americanized (Kibria 2002; Kim 2009; Park 2006). As a result, they do not feel ethnically accepted as culturally different foreigners, although their social alienation and disappointment in their ethnic homeland are considerably less than among their Korean Chinese counterparts. Similar trends are observable among Japanese Americans in Japan, although their ethnic experiences seem more positive, partly because the Japanese generally have a more favorable attitude toward the United States than Koreans (Tsuda 2009). The Finland Swedes seem to have the best of both worlds. As ethnic return migrants from First World Finland, they are socioeconomically well integrated in Sweden as middle-class professionals and students, and as diasporic descendants from a neighboring country, they are culturally similar to majority Swedes (Hedberg 2009).

Diasporic Return and Ethnic Identity

The negative ethnic reception and ambivalent homecomings experienced by many diasporic return migrants from the developing world in their countries of ethnic origin have a significant impact on their ethno-national identities. When confronted by social alienation as immigrant minorities, most ethnic return migrant groups seem to experience a decline in their transnational diasporic attachments to their ethnic homelands and a strengthening of nationalist identifications in response to their sociocultural differences with the homeland populace (see also Capo Zmiegac 2005: 208–210). Others seek out alternative forms of ethno-national belonging as
they reconsider their position in the diaspora. For most ethnic return migrants, therefore, a previously stronger diasporic consciousness based on their ancestral origins is replaced by more parochial ethnic identifications based on their different cultural backgrounds.

From transnational affinity to deterritorialized nationalism

In most cases, ethnic return migrants strengthen their nationalist attachments to their countries of birth in response to their ethnic and socioeconomic marginalization in their ancestral homelands. Not only do they realize that they are cultural foreigners who do not belong in their country of ethnic origin, they often develop negative perceptions of it because of the discrimination they face as ethnic minorities and their degrading work experiences. This causes them to distance themselves from their ancestral homeland by affirming their status as foreign nationals, which can become a defensive counter-identity asserted in opposition to the host society. Some of them also develop a renewed nationalist appreciation of their country of birth in response to their negative experiences in their country of ethnic origin. In this manner, the dislocations of migration can produce a form of “deterritorialized” migrant nationalism where national loyalties are articulated outside the territorial boundaries of the nation-state.

This deterritorialized nationalism among ethnic return migrants is quite ironic since most of them were ethnic minorities in their countries of birth who had never adopted strong nationalist identities. For instance, Japanese Brazilians were seen (and saw themselves) as a “Japanese” minority in Brazil and did not strongly identify with majority Brazilians. However, they suddenly embrace their “Brazilianess” in Japan to an extent they never had in Brazil (Tsuda 2003a: ch. 4). Likewise, Aussiedler were regarded as Germans in Russia, but are seen as Russians after return migration to Germany (von Koppenfels 2009). Korean Chinese were an ethnic Korean minority in China but see themselves as Chinese in South Korea (Song 2009). This resurgence of nationalist identification with the country of birth among ethnic return migrants is often accompanied by active engagement in its national cultural activities. Thus, we find Japanese Brazilians dancing samba (often for the first time) in their ethnic homeland of Japan and German Aussiedler singing Russian songs in Germany.

The strength of deterritorialized nationalism among diasporic return migrants depends on the level of ethnic alienation they experience in their ancestral homelands. For instance, although Argentines of Spanish descent in Spain become more aware of their Argentine backgrounds and culture when faced with an ambivalent ethnic homecoming, since they are more culturally similar to their Spanish hosts their assertion of nationalist difference seems to be less strong than other diasporic returnees (see also Viladrich 2005). In contrast, Italo-Argentine return migrants, who do not feel as much linguistic and cultural commonality with their Italian homeland, seem to develop a stronger nationalist attachment to Argentina (Grossutti 2006).
For other groups of ethnic return migrants, the assertion of nationalist difference in response to their negative diasporic homecoming is not based on an increased cultural attachment to their countries of birth but on a reaffirmation of their ancestral nationalities by claiming that they have maintained ethnic cultural traditions abroad better than their co-ethnics living in the homeland. This is the case with ethnic Hungarian descendants from Romania who return-migrate to Hungary. When they are socially excluded and labeled as Romanians by mainstream Hungarians, the Hungarian Romanians refuse to accept this ethnic categorization, and instead, claim a purer Hungarian identity (as the "real Hungarians"), which becomes a form of nationalist differentiation from their Hungarian hosts, who have supposedly been contaminated by modernity and are no longer truly Hungarian (Fox 2003: 458-459; 2009). Ethnic Russians who repatriate to Russia, Mongolian Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, as well as ethnic Greeks in Asia Minor and ethnic Croats in the former Yugoslavia, who return-migrate to their homelands seem to have analogous experiences (Capo Zmegac 2005: 212; Pilkington 1998: 168-171; de Tinguy 2003: 125).

In this manner, the ethnic encounter between diasporic descendants and their co-ethnics in the ancestral homeland often leads to exclusionary nationalist identities based on cultural difference rather than transnational identifications based on shared ethnic commonalities among peoples from different countries. Since most ethnic return migrants feel their ancestral heritage is denied by their negative reception in their homelands, few develop multiple transnational attachments to both their countries of birth and those of ethnic origin but come to identify more exclusively as nationals from a foreign country or claim a more authentic ethno-national identity that excludes their co-ethnics in the homeland. The sense of shared descent and bloodline that initially created transnational ethnic attachments across borders between diasporic descendants and their homeland populaces is overridden by the stark national cultural differences that emerge when these co-ethnics actually meet in the ancestral homeland. This is an example of how transnational mobility ironically creates a renewal of nationalist attachments instead of producing transnational, hybrid identifications across national borders.

Non-nationalist, diasporic identities

Although most ethnic return migrants redefine their identities in nationalist ways, some groups seem to adopt a non-nationalist ethnic identity as diasporic people whose sense of belonging cannot be defined in nationalist terms (see also King and Christou 2010: 114). This occurs among diasporic returnees who distance themselves from the host society in response to their negative ethnic homecoming but remain reluctant to embrace a nationalist identification with their country of birth for various reasons. For instance, when Japanese Peruvian returnees in Japan are denied their previous Japanese ethnic identities, they do not strengthen their nationalist identities as Peruvians because Peruvianess is not well regarded in Japan and the immigrant community contains illegal, non-Japanese-descent Peruvian nationals.
Instead, the Japanese Peruvians adopt a diasporic ethnic identity as *nikkei* (peoples of Japanese descent born and raised abroad), which serves as a means of cultural differentiation from the Japanese while also distancing themselves from illegal, non-*nikkei* Peruvians (Takenaka 2009).

It is also possible that ethnic return migrants who suffer considerable exclusion and discrimination in both their countries of birth and their ethnic homelands may adopt non-nationalist, diasporic ethnic identities that are not based on loyalty to either nation-state. This process of double marginalization seems to be the case with Korean Americans in South Korea, who do not feel completely at home either in the United States, where they are racialized minorities, or in South Korea, where they are cultural minorities. Thus diasporic return produces for them a heightened sense of hybridity and "inbetweeness," as people who are both American and Korean but not fully either (Kim 2009), causing some of them to use the diasporic term "Chae mi kyopo" (ethnically Korean descendants from America) to refer to themselves (Park 2006). Like the *nikkei* consciousness of the Japanese Peruvians, these Korean Americans are also adopting an identity as diasporic descendants abroad who do not belong to either their country of birth or of ethnic origin.⁴

**Transnational identifications**

Only a few ethnic return migrants from developed countries who enjoy a certain degree of social acceptance in their homelands seem to develop a transnational identification in which their allegiance to their countries of birth is accompanied by a strengthened attachment to their ethnic homelands. For instance, although Korean and Japanese Americans do experience some ethnic marginalization in their homelands (which can lead to a heightened sense of Americanness), their more positive reception and socioeconomic position leaves them with a greater appreciation and pride in their ethnic heritage (Kibria 2002). Therefore, some Korean Americans in Korea seem to appropriate a more cosmopolitan, transnational identity as "globalized Koreans" (Park 2006). A number of Japanese Americans in Japan also emerge from their sojourn with a transnational appreciation of their ethnic heritage as well as a greater cosmopolitan consciousness (Tsuda 2009).⁵ This may also be so for the Finland Swedes, whose sociocultural integration and assimilation into Swedish society over time has been quite successful (see also Hedberg 2009). Since they eventually adopt a majority Swedish identity, while retaining their Finland Swedish identities in private, they may be developing multiple, transnational affiliations to both Sweden and Finland.

**Ethnic Return Migration, Immigrant Settlement, and the Changing Meanings of Home and Homeland**

Diasporic return does not simply transform migrants' ethnic identities, it also causes them to reconsider the meaning of homeland. Ethnic return migrants technically have two homelands: the ethnic homeland, where their ethnic group originated,
and the natal homeland, where they were born and raised. Unlike other types of immigrants, who are often part of the majority society in their natal homeland, most ethnic return migrants were ethnic minorities in their country of birth because of their foreign descent. However, when they return-migrate to their ethnic homeland, they become minorities all over again because of their foreign cultural upbringing, causing some of them to feel that they are a people without a homeland.

Quite often, the negative diasporic homecomings and sociocultural alienation experienced by most ethnic return migrants challenge their previously idealized and nostalgic affinity for their ethnic homeland. As a result, their country of ethnic origin comes to no longer feel like a homeland (cf. Christou 2006: 1048; Fox 2003: 457; Capo Zmegac 2005: 205) because it has lost the positive emotional affect as a place of desire and longing which make homelands meaningful. However, as is the case with Korean Chinese and Japanese Brazilians, when diasporic returnees are alienated from their ethnic homeland, they may redefine their natal homeland as the true homeland (Song 2009; Tsuda 2009; see also Pilkington 1998, 194; Capo Zmegac 2005: 206 for ethnic Russians and other groups). Although they did not initially regard their country of birth as a “homeland” per se, when they are separated from it through migration and are confronted by a negative ethnic reception abroad, they become “homesick” and develop positive nostalgic sentiments for their natal country as the place where they truly belonged. In this manner, homelands are often discovered through migration and physical absence, causing ethnic return migrants to prioritize their natal over their ethnic homeland.

At the same time, we must be careful to distinguish the concept of homeland from the concept of home. Although they are often conflated and used interchangeably in the literature (based on the assumption that “home” is located in the homeland; see, e.g., Espiritu 2003: 2, 11; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001: 6; Parreñas 2001: 55–56), the two places do not always correspond for migrants. Homeland is a place of origin to which one feels emotionally attached whereas home is a stable place of residence that feels secure, comfortable, and familiar (see Constable 1999: 206–207; Markowitz 2004: 24; Stefansson 2004: 174). Whereas it is often the case that homeland is a place where individuals feel at home, home and homeland are not always the same place.

In fact, diasporic return can create a disconnection between home and homeland. This seems to be especially true for Korean Americans in South Korea. Although they do not feel as alienated from their country of ancestral origin as do their counterparts from the developing world, they certainly do not feel at home in their ethnic homeland. As a result, they eventually differentiate between South Korea as their homeland of racial origin and the United States as their home, where they feel more culturally familiar and comfortable (Kim 2009; see also Park 2006). In this case, it is the concept of home (not homeland) which shifts, from the place of racial belonging (South Korea) to the place of cultural belonging (United States).

Even if ethnic return migrants do not initially feel at home in their ethnic homeland, this has not prevented them from settling in the host society and eventually making it into a new home. Despite their ethnic and social alienation in their ancestral country, most of them are not returning to their countries of birth because of
the greater economic opportunities and security they enjoy in the host society. Just as instrumental economic pressures (not ethnic affinity per se) initiated their return migration, it seems that such practical economic considerations and incentives again influence their decision to settle long term, if not permanently, in the ancestral country, even if it remains an ethnically inhospitable place where they are not socially well integrated.

The settlement of ethnic return migrants is causing another disjuncture between home and homeland. Although the ethnic “homeland” does not feel like a homeland to many of them, it has definitely become a home over time, as many have decided to settle long term with their families and have grown accustomed to life in these countries. As mentioned earlier, large return migrant groups such as Russian Jews, ethnic German Aussiedler, ethnic Russian repatriates, and Japanese-descent nikkeijin have created very cohesive immigrant ethnic communities with a wide range of ethnic businesses, various services, organizations, and churches, and an active ethnic media, all supported by extensive transnational economic, political, and social connections with their sending countries (see, e.g., Remennick 2003; de Tinguy 2003:124; Tsuda 2003a). Although they remain socially alienated in the host society, they feel well situated and comfortable living in these self-contained immigrant communities, where they can conduct their daily lives amongst family and compatriots in culturally familiar settings without much contact with mainstream society, while remaining actively in touch with their countries of birth. As a result, they have created a home away from the natal homeland. Undoubtedly, the immigrant host society does not have to be experienced as a homeland for it to be considered as a home. In fact, immigrants around the world have shown a remarkable ability to create homes in alienating, foreign places (see, e.g., Constable 1999: 208; Markowitz 2004: 25), and ethnic return migrants are no exception, enabling them to resist the negative effects of their social alienation and homesickness abroad (Tsuda 2003b). In this sense, the diaspora has truly come home.

Notes

1 Although ethnic return migration is often referred to as “co-ethnic migration,” “ethnic affinity migration,” or “ethnic migration” in the literature, these terms will generally not be used in this chapter because of their greater ambiguity.

2 Some white Americans of European descent have also returned to their ethnic homelands (as tourists or otherwise) in search of their ancestral roots (see, e.g., Basu 2005).

3 For American ethnic return migrants, the level of anti-American sentiment in their ethnic homelands has a significant impact on their host society reception (cf. Christou 2006a: 836–837).

4 An analogous process occurs among Korean Japanese ethnic return migrants in Japan (Kweon 2006). Some ethnic Germans also seem to adopt a non-nationalist, diasporic identity as Aussiedler who are neither Russian nor German (see von Koppenfels 2009).

5 This also seems to be the case with Chinese Americans on ethnic heritage tours in China (Louie 2004).
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When the Diaspora Returns Home: Ambivalent Encounters


